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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Charles Leo Baker appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction,
challenging his concurrent unified sentences.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On February 14, 2010, Baker, a 35-year-old man, attempted to rape a 16-yearold girl, K.S.N. (PSI, p.2.) Earlier that evening, Baker had driven his stepson to a party
at a friend's house. (PSI, p.4.) Baker lingered at the party, making-out with some of the
high school girls. (Id.) Baker managed to get K.S.N. back to his van, where he pulled
her into the van, got on top of her, and pinned her down. (PSI, p.2.) K.S.N.'s skirt was
hiked up and her panties removed. (Id.) Baker then proceeded to fondle and grope
K.S.N., touching her breasts, inserting his finger into her vagina, and attempting to rape
her while she screamed for him to stop. (Id.) Friends at the party, hearing K.S.N.'s
cries for help, came to her rescue but found the van locked. (Id.) The stepson opened
the van and they found Baker in flagrante delicto, thrusting down on K.S.N., attempting
to have sex with her. (Id.) The friends, fighting Baker off of K.S.N., managed to pull her
to safety. (Id.)
The state charged Baker with sexual battery of a minor, attempted rape, and
penetration with a foreign object. (R., pp.42-43.) On the day of trial, Baker entered a
plea agreement with prosecutors pursuant to which he pled guilty to Counts I and " of
the Information, and the state dismissed Count "I. (R., p.65; see also Tr., p.5, LS.13-18;
p.10, L.2 - p.12, L.25.) In giving his plea on the sexual battery charge, Baker disputed
the factual basis, stating that he "wasn't sure if [he] did touch her breasts," though he
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was "pretty sure the state [could] prove [he] did," and so pled pursuant to Alford. 1 (Tr.,
p.10, L.13 - p.11, L.21.) The district court entered judgments of conviction on the two
charges and sentenced Baker to concurrent unified sentences of ten years with two
years fixed. (R., pp.89-91.) Baker filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.93-95.)

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

2

ISSUES

Baker states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Whether the district court imposed a vindictive sentence after Mr.
Baker exercised his right to enter an Alford plea.
2.
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
concurrent unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, upon Mr.
Baker following his plea of guilty to sexual battery of a minor, who is
sixteen or seventeen years old, and attempted rape.
(Appellant's brief, pA.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Baker failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to review for the first
time on appeal of his unpreserved claim that the district court imposed a vindictive
sentence?
2.
Has Baker failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in
imposing concurrent unified sentences of ten years with two years fixed upon Baker's
convictions for sexual battery of a minor and attempted rape?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Baker Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Appellate Review Of
His Unpreserved Vindictive Sentence Claim
A.

Introduction
Recognizing that no presumption of vindictiveness applies to his sentence, Baker

asserts that the district court's concurrent unified sentences of ten years with two years
fixed, imposed on Baker's convictions for sexual battery of a minor and attempted rape,
were vindictive. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-9.) Baker acknowledges that this argument was
not preserved below, and can only be reviewed on appeal if imposition of his sentence
constitutes fundamental error.

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)

Baker has failed to establish

fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).

Absent a timely objection, the

appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental
error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961,978 (2010).

C.

The District Court's Sentence Is Not Vindictive
This Court will not review a claim of vindictive sentence brought for the first time

on appeal unless the appellant first establishes fundamental error.

State v. Grist,

Docket No. 37372, 2012 Opinion No.1 Q at 6-7 (Ct. App. 2012). Under the standard
announced by the Idaho State Supreme Court in Perry, to establish fundamental error,
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the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.

!fL. at 226,245 P.3d at 978.
1.

Baker has failed to meet this appellate burden.

Baker Has Failed To Show A Violation Of An Unwaived Constitutional
Right

Baker argues that the district court violated his constitutional right to due process
by considering the fact that Baker had entered an Alford plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.67.) The statement Baker relies upon to make this argument was made in the context of
the district court's observation that Baker had never fully accepted responsibility for his
criminal conduct. (See Tr., p.31, L.9 - p.32, L.12.) In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that declaration of guilt is not
constitutionally required for a valid guilty plea.

~

at 37. Contrary to Baker's assertions,

however, Alford did not create a constitutional right that would prohibit a district court
from considering at sentencing a defendant's continued refusal to accept responsibility
for his criminal conduct.
Rather, in State v. Alston, 534 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. App. 2000), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, relying in part on State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 896 P.2d 1002 (Ct.
App. 1995), explained in the context of a challenge to a probation revocation proceeding
that an Alford plea does not result in any special privileges beyond the plea entry
hearing:
[A]n "Alford plea" constitutes "a guilty plea in the same way that a plea of
nolo contendere or no contest is a guilty plea." State ex reI. Warren v.
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Schwarz, 219 Wis.2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698, 706 (1998); see Alford, 400
U.S. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 167-68, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171 (no "material difference
between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a
plea containing a protestation of innocence"); [People v.l Birdsong, 958
P .2d [1124,] 1130 [(Colo. 1998)] ("An Alford plea is to be treated as a
guilty plea and a sentence may be imposed accordingly.").
As a consequence, in accepting an "Alford plea" as
a concession to [a] defendant, [the trial court accords that
defendant] no implications or assurances as to future
revocation proceedings.
Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1129. In other words, an "Alford plea" is in no way
"infused with any special promises," Warren, 579 N.W.2d at 711, nor does
acceptance thereof constitute "a promise that a defendant will never have
to admit his guilt," id.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Warren:
[a] defendant's protestations of innocence under an Alford
plea extend only to the plea itself.

... "There is nothing inherent in the nature of an Alford plea
that gives a defendant any rights, or promises any
limitations, with respect to the punishment imposed after the
conviction. "
... Put simply, an Alford plea is not the saving grace for
defendants who wish to maintain their complete innocence.
Rather, it is a device that defendants may call upon to avoid
the expense, stress and embarrassment of trial and to limit
one's exposure to punishment [and it is] not the saving grace
for defendants who wish to maintain their complete
innocence.
~

at 707 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see generally Smith v.
Com., 27 Va. App. 357,499 S.E.2d 11,13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry,
127 Idaho 94, 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995)) ('''[A]lthough an
Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of
innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions ... [but
the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime,
including [the] defendant's lack of remorse. "').
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Alston, 534 S.E.2d at 669-670.
The principles expressed in Alston show that an Alford plea does not require
preferential treatment of a defendant after the plea is entered. Adopting the language of
Alston, "[Baker's] protestations of innocence under an Alford plea extend only to the
plea itself."

kl (quoting Warren v.

Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d 698,707 (1998)). While Alford

allows a defendant to enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt, it does not require a
district court at sentencing to ignore the defendant's continued refusal to accept
responsibility for his crime.

Baker has failed to establish that any of his unwaived

constitutional rights were violated.

2.

The Alleged Error Is Not Clear On The Record

Baker argues that the district court's statement that "I am [imposing sentence] in
consideration of the fact that you entered an Alford plea .... " clearly demonstrates a
violation of Baker's rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) To make this argument, Baker
has removed the court's statement from its context.

In considering an appropriate

sentence for Baker and weighing the relevant sentencing factors, the district court said:
Rehabilitation, which is the likelihood of being able to rehabilitate
the offender such that the offense does not occur again. And that
dovetails with the concept of public protection.
The representations in the police reports are pretty graphic, pretty
troubling. And I note particularly there is a comment attributed to you
which you didn't contest on page 3. It says that he stated he did not know
how her panties got off. He stated he just let things get out of hand,
described the situation as being, quote, the wrong place, wrong time,
wrong puss. That speaks volumes to me about your attitude at the time.
And you have contested the representations on page 13.
understand that. But I think the fact remains that other witnesses heard
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the victim screaming from the van and had to strike you to get you to stop.
So I think protection of the public is a strong factor here, as well as
rehabilitation.

Having pled guilty, I find you are guilty. Having considered the four
Toohill factors, I am going to impose a sentence as follows: I am going to
impose two years fixed, eight years indeterminate, for a unified ten-year
sentence. And I am doing that in consideration of the fact that you
entered an Alford plea, which essentially means you dispute the conduct,
but you agree that the state can probably prove most of it.
You did plead guilty. That's accepting responsibility to a degree.
just don't see this as a retained jurisdiction case. I think if you are going to
be rehabilitated it is going to take longer than the one-year period ....
(Tr., p.31, L.5 - p.32, L.15.)
At sentencing, the district court also had the PSI wherein Baker shifted blame for
his crimes to his victim (see PSI, p.4); Dr. Wert's psychosexual evaluation, which noted
Baker's minimization of his criminal conduct (PSI, p.38); and Dr. Wolfe's psychosexual
evaluation, in which Baker absolutely refused to take responsibility for his criminal
conduct, complaining that "they railroaded me-I pled guilty to something I didn't do"
(PSI, p.49).
As noted above, a major concern for the district court was Baker's rehabilitative
potential in light of his refusal to take responsibility for his actions. (Tr., p.31, Ls.17-22.)
Failure to acknowledge guilt may indicate a lack of rehabilitative potential. Grist, 2012
Opinion No. 10 at 12. That the district court imposed a sentence on Baker rather than
retain jurisdiction solely in retaliation for Baker's entering an Alford plea, as opposed to
Baker's refusal to acknowledge any responsibility for his criminal actions, is anything but
clear on the record.

8

3.

Baker Has Failed To Demonstrate Prejudice

Baker asserts as fact that he received "a more excessive sentence because he
chose to make an Alford plea," because the district court chose to impose a sentence
rather than follow the presentence investigator's recommendation of retaining
jurisdiction.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.)

To meet the fundamental error standard,

prejudice must be predicated on error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. The
district court's considering at sentencing Baker's continued refusal to accept
responsibility for his criminal actions is not error, as discussed above.

The district

court's exercising of its discretion to execute the sentence rather than retain jurisdiction
is also not error. See I.C. § 19-2601(4); State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227,230,832
P.2d 1162,1166 (Ct. App. 1992). Because there is no error, there can be no prejudice
predicated upon error.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the district court erred by considering Baker's
Alford plea during sentencing, the evidence that Baker refused to take any responsibility
for his crime, the very nature of that crime, and Baker's low likelihood of rehabilitation
anytime in the near future, all support the court's ultimate sentencing decision. (See
Argument, part II.) Even assuming error, Baker has still failed to show any prejudice.
Baker has failed to establish fundamental error in the district court's considering
at sentencing his continued refusal to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct. The
judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
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II.
Baker Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Upon Baker's convictions for sexual battery of a minor and attempted rape, the

district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of ten years with two years fixed.
(R., pp.89-91.) On appeal, Baker argues that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion by not retaining jurisdiction, in light of allegedly mitigating factors.

,
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-17.) Baker has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's
sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore,

131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). "Whether to retain jurisdiction is a question left to the court's
discretion." State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing I.C. § 19-2601 (4); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709
(Ct. App. 1982».

C.

The District Court's Sentence Is Not Excessive
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish

that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000». To
carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,38 P.3d at 615. A sentence of
confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is
10

necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case." Toohm, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. Though courts review the whole
sentence on appeal, the presumption is that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho
at 568, 650 P.2d at 710.

"When a court has sufficient information at the time of

sentencing to deny probation, its refusal to retain jurisdiction for further evaluation is not
an abuse of discretion." Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 230, 832 P.2d at 1166 (citing State v.
Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 979, 751 P.2d 673,675 (Ct. App. 1988)).
The nature of Baker's criminal conduct supports the sentence imposed by the
district court. Baker drove his stepson to a party at a friend's house. (PSI, pA.) Baker
lingered at the party, making-out with high school girls. (Id.) Baker managed to get one
of the girls back to his van, where he pulled her into the van, got on top of her, and
pinned her down. (PSI, p.2.) The girl's skirt was hiked up and her panties removed.
(Id.) Baker then proceeded to fondle and grope the girl, touching her breasts, inserting
his finger into her vagina, and attempting to rape her while the girl screamed for him to
stop. (Id.) Friends at the party, hearing the girl's cries for help, came to her rescue but
found the van locked.

(Id.)

The stepson opened the van and they found Baker in

flagrante delicto, thrusting down on the girl, attempting to have sex with her. (Id.) The

friends, fighting Baker off of the girl, managed to pull her to safety. (ld.)
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Baker's refusal to take responsibility for his criminal conduct also supports the
district court's sentence. In the PSI, Baker shifted blame for his crimes to his victim.
(PSI, pA.). In his first psychosexual evaluation he minimized his criminal conduct. (See
PSI, p.38).

In his second psychosexual evaluation he outright refused to take

responsibility for his criminal conduct, complaining that "they railroaded me-I pled
guilty to something I didn't do." (PSI, pA9.) A major concern for the district court at
sentencing was Baker's lack of rehabilitative potential in light of this refusal to take
responsibility for his actions. (Tr., p.31, L.5 - p.32, L.15) Failure to acknowledge guilt
may indicate a lack of rehabilitative potential. State v. Grist, Docket No. 37372, 2012
Opinion No. 10 at 12 (Ct. App. 2012). Because Baker lacked rehabilitative potential, he
was not a good candidate for probation. Because Baker was not a good candidate for
probation, the district court cannot be said to have abused its discretion by electing to
impose sentence rather than retain jurisdiction. Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 230,832 P.2d
at 1166.
Baker has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing
discretion. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Baker's convictions and
sentences.

DATED this 24th day of May, 2012.

CR~
Deputy Attorney General
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